Can we do more?

There are theorists who theorise that Pakistan's strategic thinkers look at the Taliban as a strategic asset and that is why the Pakistan army does not want to do more. I really have no way of finding out whether the theory holds much validity or not. What I am about to do, therefore, is to try to ascertain Pakistan's capacity to do more -- as opposed to the army's willingness to do more.

Consider this: the Pakistan army's 37th Mechanised Infantry Division and X Corps' 19th Infantry Division are both in Swat. XI Corps' 7th Infantry Division is in North Waziristan and its 9th Infantry Division is in South Waziristan. Special Services Group's 7th Commando Zarrar Battalion is also engaged in the anti-terror campaign.

Bajaur Scouts are in Khar, Dir Scouts in Balambat, Khyber Rifles in Landi Kotal, South Waziristan Scouts in Wana, Tochi Scouts in Miranshah plus Kurram Militia, Mehsud Scouts, Mohmand Rifles and Orakzai Scouts -- all engaged in one or another aspect of our anti-terror undertaking. Then there are 6,779 Levies and 16,828 Khassadars.

I Corps has three divisions and the 37th Mechanised Division was pulled away and sent to undertake Operation Rah-e-Rast. X Corps has three divisions and we pulled out 19th Infantry Division and sent it to Swat as well. The entire XI Corps, 7th as well as its 9th Infantry Divisions have taken on the TTP in Waziristan's Operation Rah-e-Nijat (II Corps' 14th Infantry Division is reportedly involved as well). Right now, at least 20 per cent of our combat capacity is entangled in the anti-terror effort.

The Pakistan army maintains military outposts at Wana, Jandola, Ramzak, Miranshah and Mir Ali. Miranshah also has a helicopter fleet and there are army formations in Sara Rogha, Janta, Piazha and Makeen. All in all, we have deployed some 220,000 soldiers, military and paramilitary.

Swat has largely been cleared of extremists but the two divisions there would be required to prevent militant re-infiltration. By December 12, 2009, the army had captured all major militant strongholds in South Waziristan but at least two divisions would be required to hold the cleared territory free of militants.

To be certain, all these victories have not been without a heavy cost, both human and financial. Total Pakistani fatalities in terrorist violence from 2003 to 2009 now stand at 24,624 -- compare that with 1,477 coalition deaths in the Operation Enduring Freedom. For the record, 43 countries have contributed troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) but Pakistan by itself has done more -- and sacrificed more -- than all those 43 countries combined. Clearly, counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) east of the Durand Line has been far more successful than COIN undertaken west of Durand.

Can we do more? The Indian army has 6,384 tanks in its inventory (as none of those Indian tanks can cross the Himalayas into China so Arjun MBTs must all be for Pakistan). The Indian air force has 672 combat aircraft. The Indian army's XV, IX, XVI, XIV, XI and X corps are all pointing their guns towards Pakistan. Indian army's 4th Armoured Division, 12th Infantry Division, 340th Mechanised Brigade and 4th Armoured Brigade have been deployed to cut Pakistan into two halves. The Pakistan army, thus, has no choice but to defend -- defend they must -- Pakistan's eastern border.

How can the world expect Pakistan to do more than what it is already doing? America wants the Pakistan army to neutralise threats to the mainland US but the Pakistan army must first neutralise threats to mainland Pakistan.

PS: On December 24, Prime Minister Gilani said that there weren't any forces conspiring against his government. The same day President Zardari said that there were forces conspiring against his government. Could they both be right?

Dr Farrukh Saleem is the executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies(CRSS)in Islamabad